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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INDIRECT
CONSUMER ADVERTISING OF ATTENTION
DISORDER STIMULANTS AND CREATING
LIMITS TO WITHSTAND CONSTITUTIONAL
SCRUTINY.
Matthew N. Strawn"

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, pharmaceutical drug companies have been
inundating consumers with advertising images for their products.
Whether the ailment is a seasonal allergy, severe heartburn or even
erectile dysfunction, television and print advertisements convey a
sense that help is available. There has been one notable exception to
the proliferation of prescription drug advertising directed at the
consumer - advertisements marketing controlled drugs, such as
stimulants. However, this too is changing.
As parents prepared their children for the start of the 2001 school
year, they were greeted for the first time with advertisements pitching
behavior control drugs for their children. One company used a bluesuited superhero to advertise in publications, such as Ladies' Home
Journal, in an attempt to better reach parents! This pushing of the
advertising envelope for prescription stimulants, like Ritalin, is
contrary to a thirty-year old international agreement prohibiting the
advertisement of such controlled substances.2
The use of Ritalin, the most commonly known stimulant among
those used to control the behavior of hyperactive and disruptive
children, has been at the center of controversy in America's medical

. J.D. 2003, The Catholic University of America of America Columbus School
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1. Karen Thomas, Back to school for ADHD drugs, USA TODAY, Aug. 28,
2001 at D1.
2. Id.
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and educational communities for decades.3 Now that pharmaceutical
manufacturers are directly advertising these controlled substances to
the public, many public officials and law enforcement agencies have
also taken notice. 4
This Comment will explore the legal issues surrounding the
emerging direct-to-consumer advertising of controlled pharmaceutical
stimulants. In Part II, this Comment will discuss Schedule II
prescription stimulants, recent actions in state legislatures and the
trend by pharmaceutical companies to promote these controlled
substances directly to consumers. Part III will explain direct-toconsumer advertising with regard to the federal statutes and
regulations that control pharmaceutical advertising. Part IV will
examine the Constitutional framework for regulating commercial
speech. Finally Part V, applying the current Constitutional framework,
the Comment will conclude with an analysis on how to construct a
prohibition on psychotropic pharmaceutical product advertising that
survives First Amendment scrutiny.
II.

BACKGROUND ISSUES

A. The CurrentTreatment of Schedule II Stimulants

For nearly fifty years, parents have utilized prescription drugs,
chiefly stimulants, to treat attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD)' The international
non-proprietary name for these drugs is
"methylphenidate."6 The most common of such behavior drugs is
Ritalin, which first received approval from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in 1955. 7

3. Pamela White, High on Ritalin: A Nation of Dopes Numbs Its Kids with
Drugs, BOULDER WEEKLY, Oct. 4,2001.
4. See Thomas, supra note 1. After seeing the Medadate CD ads in Ladies
Home Journal and Parade,the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency sent a cease-anddesist letter to Celltech, Medadate CD's manufacturer.
5. Melody Petersen & Kate Zernike, Schools' Backing of Behavior Drugs
Comes Under Fire,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, at Al.
6. See United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Protocol on
Psychotropic Substances, Official Records, Volume 1 (New York 1973) UN Doc.
E/CONF.58/7; UN Publication Sales No.E.73XI.3 [hereinafter 1971 Agreement].
7. Petersen & Zernike, supra note 5, at Al; see also Drugs of Abuse, U.S.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE,

METHYLPHENIDATE,

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/methylphenidate.html

(last visited
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The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 is the legal foundation that
requires the classification of drugs.8 It also delegates authority to
federal agencies to place all substances that are regulated under
existing federal law into one of five schedules. 9 Placement is based
upon the substance's medicinal value, harmfulness and potential for
abuse or addiction. ° The five schedule scheme operates as a sliding
scale." Schedule I regulates the most dangerous drugs that have no
recognized medical use, 12 while Schedule V is reserved for the least
dangerous drugs. 3

Methylphenidate (hereinafter Ritalin) is classified as a Schedule II
stimulant.14 Other drugs classified under Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) Schedule II status include opium, cocaine and morphine. 5
Since it is classified as a Schedule II stimulant, the abuse of Ritalin may
produce the same effects as abusing cocaine or amphetamines. 6 The
addictive properties of Ritalin resulted in the DEA listing it as one of
the top ten pharmaceutical drugs most likely to be stolen. 7
B. Action in the States
There appear to be various political and policy goals behind the
renewed interest for state actions related to Ritalin and its
pharmaceutical progeny. While discussion on this topic alone could
easily consume volumes, there are two major concerns. The first is the
addictive nature of Ritalin and its abuse by children and young adults
who are not diagnosed with ADHD. Second, is the explosive growth in

Feb. 10, 2003) (According to the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),
the primary and legitimate use of methylphenidate is for the treatment of attention
deficit disorders in children.).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).
9. Id.
10. U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/csa.html (last visited

Feb.6, 2003).
11.
12.

Id.
DEA Schedules of Controlled Substances, 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2002).

13. Id. § 1308.15.
14.

See id. § 1308.12(d).

15.

See id. § 1308.12

16.
17.

Drugs of Abuse, supra note 7.
Lisa Fine, New Laws Leave Ritalin Decisions to Parents and Doctors,
EDUCATION WEEK, Aug. 8, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 12046655.
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the number of children taking stimulants to modify their behavior. 8 It
is against this backdrop that there has been significant action on
Ritalin and psychotropic drugs throughout state legislatures.
In 2001, Minnesota approved legislation directly addressing the use
of Ritalin in the state educational systems." Minnesota law now
restrains school administrators from requiring parents to provide
behavioral medication to their children before readmitting them to
school after being suspended. 0 Minnesota also codified that a parent's
refusal to provide his or her child with such medication does not
constitute educational neglect.2 Finally, the Minnesota law provides
resources to study the use of medications, like Ritalin, in the state and
to report the number and overall incidence rate of its school children
diagnosed with ADHD who are currently taking behavioral drugs.22
The law's chief sponsor in the Minnesota House of Representatives,
Representative Barb Sykora, said that the legislation was necessary
because recent studies linked Ritalin to later cocaine use as well as to
the increase in the recreational abuse of children's behavioral drugs. 3
Connecticut took a step further in combating the rise of Ritalin use
among the state's school children. Connecticut now requires its school
boards to "adopt and implement policies prohibiting any school
personnel from recommending the use of psychotropic drugs for any
child., 24 Also, as in Minnesota, Connecticut provides that the refusal of
a parent to medicate his or her child with psychotropic drugs does not
constitute grounds for the state's child protection agency to take the
child into custody. 5 Nor does it constitute grounds for a state court to
order a child to be taken into custody by the Connecticut Department

18. Thomas, supra note 1, at DI (The use of ADHD drugs is up thirty-seven
percent over the past five years, and the prescriptions for one specific product,
Adderall, has increased 1,017% since 1997).
19. Id.
20. 2001 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 6, art. 3, §8 (West).
21. Id. § 16.
22. Id. § 21.
23. Press Release, Rep. Sykora Introduces "Ritalin Relief Act": Bi-Partisan
Legislation Gives Parents More Control of their Children's Health (Feb. 6, 2001)
(on file with author).
24. Act of Oct. 1, 2001, No. 01-124, § 1, 2001 Conn. Acts 331, 331 (Reg. Sess.)
(concerning the recommendations for and refusals of the use of psychotropic drugs
by children).
25. Id. § 2.
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of Children and Families. 2 6 The author of the legislation in the
Connecticut House of Representatives, Representative Lenny
Winkler, is an emergency room nurse who said she regularly witnesses
the consequences of increased prescribing of psychotropic drugs and
that there are "just too many far-reaching effects of these drugs., 27 The
Connecticut General Assembly also heard testimony regarding studies
indicating Ritalin may cause children to smoke or abuse stimulants as
adults.28
Armed with similar evidence, other states are following suit. Texas2 9
and Colorado 3° have approved non-binding resolutions that require
educators to consider non-medical solutions to behavioral problems.
Also, citing deep concern over the increased use of medication to
control behavior in children, legislation is pending in the New Jersey
State Assembly that would model Connecticut in prohibiting school
personnel from "recommending, encouraging, or discussing
medication"
school pupils.
also been
itouein for••32
33 3' Similar legislation
3 has 63
introduced in Illinois, Iowa, New York, 34 Oregon,35 Utah,36 Virginia37
and Wisconsin.38

26.
27.

See id.
Kelly Patricia O'Meara, Hyper-Drugging of Active Kids, INSIGHT ON THE
NEWS, Aug. 27, 2001, at 18.
28. Schoolchildren and Medication: Hearing on HB 5701 Before the Public
Health Comm., 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. 0315 (Conn. 2001) (statement of Ms. Sheila
Matthews).
29. See Thomas, supra note 1, at Dl.
30. A New Prescription,GAZETTER, Feb. 14, 2002, at Metro 2.
31. A. 2170, 209th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2001).
32. See Heath Hixson, Ritalin Proposal Rejected by Panel, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, Jan. 31, 2002, at 7. An Illinois House panel voted down an attempt to
ban teachers from recommending students receive the prescription drug Ritalin.
33. H.F. 2318, 2002 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2002).
34. A. 9384, 2001 State Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001).
35. H.B. 3630, 71' Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001).
36. House Approves Curb on Child-health Referrals, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 1,
2002, at B4. See also James Thalman, Mood-altering Drugs in Schools Targeted,
DESERET NEWS, Mar. 6, 2002, at B7 (discussing debate in the Oregon State Senate
following passage of HB 123 in the Oregon State House).
37. Christina Nuckols, Ritalin for Students: House Bill Says Schools Can't
Recommend Drugs, VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND THE LEDGER-STAR, Feb. 2, 2002, at B4.
38. See Petersen & Zernike, supra note 5, at Al.
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The most extensive of these proposals is in Michigan, where five
separate bills have been introduced as a "Ritalin reform" package.39
One bill is modeled after the Connecticut law, while the others include:
creation of an advisory council on psychiatric drug use among children;
prohibition on excluding students from school or school functions for
not taking such drugs; requiring creation of brochures for schools
listing side effects of psychiatric drugs; and, amending the state's
definition of child neglect so that the refusal of a parent to provide
psychiatric drugs does not constitute criminal neglect."

C.

Celltech: Pushing the Consumer Advertising Envelope on
Controlled Substances

It is on the heels of this state legislative action that some
pharmaceutical manufacturers are using television, radio, newspapers
and magazines to promote Schedule II behavior drugs for children.
In August 2001, Celltech, makers of Metadate CD, a once-a-day pill
made to rival Ritalin, launched the first salvo in the emerging Schedule
II advertising battle. It placed direct-to-consumer print advertisements
in a number of women's magazines.' The advertisements, appearing in
such periodicals as Ladies' Home Journal and Parade, introduce the
drug by name and feature a smiling mother and son over a quote
that
42
day.,
school
whole
the
for
ADHD
his
covers
dose
"One
reads,
By promoting Metadate CD by its name, Celltech became the first
pharmaceutical company to break a thirty-year old United Nations
agreement prohibiting direct-to-consumer advertising of Schedule II
drugs.43 In response to the Metadate CD advertisements, the DEA sent
Celltech a cease-and-desist letter. 44 In addition to reminding Celltech
of the long-standing international advertising agreement, the DEA's

39.

Stacey

Range,

Bills Encourages 'Ritalin Reform,'

LANSING STATE

JOURNAL, Sept. 27, 2001, at 3B.
40.

Id.

41. See Thomas, supra note 1, at Dl; See also Kay Lazar, School Daze - KidDrugAds Spark Concern, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 2, 2001, at Al.
42. Lazar, supra note 41, at Al.
43. See id.
44.

Id.
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letter detailed the "significant risk to the national problem of
controlled substance diversion" the ads may create.
Undaunted, Celltech maintains it is breaking no American laws and
says the company "considers the communication of truthful
information to consumers and the medical community essential in
delivering quality patient care." As further evidence of Celltech's
intention to continue with its consumer-oriented marketing campaign
for Metadate CD, the company is featuring, in promotional materials,
a blue-suited cartoon superhero with the letters CD emblazoned across
his chest.47 Critics disagree with the company's assertion that the
cartoon superhero is not intended to grab the attention of children.48
The lengths to which Celltech is going to promote Metadate CD,
which was approved for distribution in April 2001,9 underscore the
competition in the billion-dollar behavioral drug market. 0 In 2001,
physicians wrote over twenty million prescriptions for ADHD
stimulants," which had sales of $758 million in 2000.52 Given the
financial stakes involved in this competitive market, there are
indications that other manufacturers are following Celltech's lead. The
makers of two other Schedule II stimulants, Adderall and Concerta,
advertise directly to consumers in print publications, but stop short of
mentioning the product's brand name and encourage the consumer to
call a toll-free number for more information. 3 McNeil Consumer
Healthcare, which manufactures Concerta, has broken new ground by
airing direct-to-consumer advertisements on cable television. 4 The
DEA claims such advertisements violate the spirit of the international
agreement. McNeil, however, points out that the advertisements are
not promoting a brand name, nor are they breaking any American
law.55

45.

Id.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
See Thomas, supra note 1, at Dl.
See id.
Lazar, supra note 41, at Al.
See Thomas, supra note 1, at Dl.
Id.
Id.

53.
54.
55.

See Thomas, supra note 1, at Dl.
See Petersen & Zernike, supra note 5, at Al.
Id.

Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law and Policy

[Vol. 19:2:1

III. DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER PRESCRIPTION DRUG ADVERTISING

The current state of the law on direct-to-consumer advertising of
Schedule II stimulants is a mix of federal statutes, regulations and a
long-standing international agreement. This section will survey
relevant federal statutes and regulations, as well as the status of the
1971 international agreement that effectively prevented consumer
advertising of controlled substances for over three decades.
A. The 1971 U.N. Conference on Psychotropic Substances.

The pharmaceutical manufacturers are correct in their assertion that
purchasing direct-to-consumer advertisements in print and electronic
media for Schedule II drugs does not violate U.S. federal law. Since
1971, however, the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic
Substances56 (hereinafter the 1971 Agreement) has served as an
international agreement between nations and the pharmaceutical
industry not to market Schedule II controlled substances to
consumers. 7 Specifically, Article 10 of the 1971 Agreement provides
that each party to the agreement "shall, with due regard to its
constitutional provisions, prohibit the advertisement of such
substances to the general public. '5 8 The United States was among the
seventy-one nations to sign this agreement. 59 This international
agreement is subject to monitoring by the United Nations Narcotics
Control Division. 60
Prior to 1971, drug manufacturers of psychotropic substances like
Ritalin only marketed their products to physicians and pharmacists. 61
Following the 1971 Agreement, Congress failed to codify Article 10's
prohibition into United States law. The deputy director of the DEA's
Office of Diversion Control acknowledged the non-statutory limits of
the 1971 Agreement, stating that the agency merely "had a 30-year

56. 1971 Agreement, supra note 6.
57. See Petersen & Zernike, supra note 5, at Al.
58. 1971 Agreement, supra note 6, at Article 10.
59. Id. at Article 1.
60. Lawrence H. Diller, An End To Marketing Victory: Drug Makers Find
Ways to Circumvent an Advertising Ban and Promote Psychiatric Drugs for
Children (Oct. 18, 2001) at http://archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/10/18/
drugads/index.html.
61. See Petersen & Zernike, supra note 5, at Al.
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agreement with the pharmaceutical industry not to advertise controlled
substances."62
B. FDA Oversight of Direct-to-ConsumerDrug Advertising
The adherence to the 1971 Agreement by nations and industry
underscores that there is no explicit U.S. federal statute or regulation
prohibiting the direct advertisement of Schedule II pharmaceutical
drugs to consumers. The 1971 Agreement has operated in the United
States merely as a gentlemen's agreement between the pharmaceutical
industry and the federal government not to engage in this type of
marketing.
However, this gentlemen's agreement is no longer honored as
faithfully between the government and the pharmaceutical industry.
Now, direct-to-consumer advertising is increasingly being used for
psychotropic drugs. This new phenomenon warrants an assessment of
the relevant and controlling statutory framework. First, the ability of
the DEA to prohibit or control such advertising is severely restricted.
The DEA's jurisdiction over direct-to-consumer advertising is limited
to cease-and-desist letters that the agency sends to companies when it
determines the companies have crossed the line in their
advertisements. One such letter was sent to Celltech regarding the
Metadate CD advertisements.
The FDA is the federal agency with primary jurisdiction over directto-consumer marketing of prescription drugs. 63 The FDA is authorized
by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act64 (FDCA) to regulate the
development, distribution and promotion of pharmaceutical products.
While the statute itself does not define "advertising," the FDCA's
implementing regulations do so in great detail.65
An important component of the FDCA relating to advertising is the
statute's prohibition on "misbranding." 6 Under the FDCA, a
prescription drug is considered "misbranded" if the manufacturer does

62.

Id. at A30.

63. Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-to-Consumer PrescriptionDrug Advertising, 25
AM. J.L. & MED.149, 154 (1999) (The Federal Trade Commission, not the FDA,
maintains federal jurisdiction over over-the-counter drug product promotion).
64. 21 U.S.C.S. § 352(n) (1998).
65. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2002).
66. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
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not provide a "true statement" of the drug. 6' The "true statement" is
required to include the following information: the product's scientific
name; the product's formula; and a "brief summary relating to [the
product's] side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness." 61 This
"true statement" must be present in "all advertisements and other
descriptive matter issued or caused to be issued by the
manufacturer., 69 Specifically, the FDCA's implementing regulations
include the following types of advertisements within the scope of the
Act: "advertisements in published journals, magazines, other
periodicals, and newspapers, and advertisements broadcast through
media such
as radio, television, and telephone communication
70
systems.,
The "brief summary" aspect of the "true statement" provides the
FDA with the basis to propose advertising regulations consistent with
the FDCA. 71 To satisfy the statutory "brief summary" requirements,
the FDA has recently established new guidelines for both print and
electronic direct-to-consumer advertising.72 The prescription drug
advertising regulations distinguish between print and broadcast
advertisements. 7 To comply with federal law, print advertisements
must include the "brief summary," which normally contains each of the
risk concepts from the product's approved package labeling.74
The requirements for broadcast advertising are considerably more
detailed and are a relatively new phenomenon. Prior to 1997, the
"brief summary" requirement effectively precluded the type of
pharmaceutical advertising seen on television today because the
lengthy risk disclosure requirement was cost prohibitive and ill-suited
to the brief nature of electronic advertising.7" During this time, the only
electronic advertisements sponsored by drug companies were reminder

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. § 352(n).
Id.
Id.
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(k)(1)(1) (2002).
Id.
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1) (2002).
See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2002).

74.

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,

GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER

available at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/guidance (last visited Sept. 30,2001) [hereinafter Guidance].
75. Anne Brown, The Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Dilemma, 35 Patient
Care (Mar. 30, 2001), availableat 2001 WL 26231381.
DIRECTED

BROADCAST

ADVERTISEMENTS,
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advertisements.76 Reminder advertisements, which name the brand
product but not the illness for which it treats, are exempt from the
FDCA's "brief summary" requirement.77
In 1997, the FDA clarified its interpretation of broadcast advertising
regulations. As an alternative to the "brief summary," sponsors of
broadcast advertisements may make an "adequate provision" to
disseminate "the approved or permitted package labeling in
connection with the broadcast presentation."' 7 8 A broadcast advertising
sponsor may fulfill the "adequate provision" requirement by providing
"reasonably convenient access to the advertised product's approved
labeling, 79 to a potentially diverse consumer audience. The FDA has
outlined four items that must be present in a broadcast media
advertisement to ensure "reasonably convenient access" exists: (1) a
toll-free number, (2) a reference to DTC print advertisements, (3) an
Internet web page address, and (4) a statement directing consumers to
doctors and/or pharmacists to receive additional information about the
advertised product.8°
The FDA also maintains additional enforcement duties over the
advertising practices of pharmaceutical companies and prescription
drugs. Although pharmaceutical companies are not required by law or
statute to submit the content of their advertising materials to the FDA
before using them, the agency does have the authority to review the
advertisements post-publication or broadcast.8 '
The actions available to the FDA to deal with pharmaceutical
companies that violate the advertising requirement are the following:
sending a company in violation of requirements a letter outlining the
agency's objections to the current advertisement; issuing a cease-anddesist letter and/or suggesting proper remedies; seizing the affected
products or enjoining use of promotions making similar claims; or
prosecuting the appropriate company or individual under criminal
law.8 Since the broadcast regulations were relaxed in 1997, the FDA
has sent more than seventy-five notices to sponsors, notifying them
that their advertisements violate the law.8 3 Most commonly, the

76.

Id.

77.
78.
79.

21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(2)(i) (2002).
Id. § 202.1(e)(1).
See Guidance, supra note 74.

80.

See id.; See also Terzian, supra note 63, at 150.

81.
82.
83.

See Terzian, supra note 63, at 153.
Id. at 153.
Brown, supra note 75, at 22.
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companies present insufficient risk information
and overstate the
84
product's efficacy or the extent of its application.
C. Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising

The recent change in FDA guidelines has opened the floodgates for
prescription drug advertisements on America's televisions and radios.
In 2000, the pharmaceutical industry spent $2.5 billion on print and
broadcast advertising,85 an increase of $700 million from the prior
year." In fact, overall spending on consumer advertisements for
prescription drugs is predicted to reach $7.5 billion a year by 2005.87 As
discussed above, the potential proliferation of advertisements for
Schedule II psychotropic drugs will only drive this figure higher.
The dramatic increase in direct-to-consumer advertising for
prescription drugs is also beginning to show an effect on patients. One
recent analysis reveals that the fifty most heavily advertised drugs in
2000 experienced a thirty-two percent increase in sales from the
previous year.8 Not only was this increase more than double the
industry average, but the data further indicates that the increase was
due to a sharp rise in the number of prescriptions filled for those fifty
drugs.89
Another recent study of direct-to-consumer advertisements for
prescription drugs found that a majority contained sparse scientific
information to assist people in making informed choices about
treatment options. 9° More specifically, the study's findings show that
the advertisements "rarely quantify a medication's expected benefit." 91
In another study, consumers were queried on their response if a
physician refused their request for an advertised drug.92 Nearly one84. Id.
85. John A. MacDonald, Drug Pitches Raise Profits and Alarms; Some Ask:
Are Ads Helping Medicine or Increasing its Costs, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 21,
2001, available at 2001 WL 25328086.
86. Ivan Oransky, Doctors Step Out, Drug Salesmen Step In,USA TODAY, July
5, 2001, at All.
87. Michael Booth, Drug Marketing Putting Pressure on Doctors, DENVER
POST, Sept. 16, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 27933835.
88. See MacDonald, supra note 85.
89. See id.
90. DTC Ads' "EmotionalAppeal" Slammed,
available at 2001 WL 9081199.
91. Id.
92. See Brown, supra note 75.

MARKETLETTER,

Oct. 22, 2001,
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half of the respondents said they would try to persuade the physician
to prescribe the requested drug, while almost one-quarter said they
would attempt to obtain the prescription from a different physician. 93
It was responses such as these that led to a June 2001 vote by the
American Medical Association on a resolution urging the prohibition
of direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertisements. 94 While the
vote was ultimately unsuccessful, 95 it indicates the concern that exists in

the medical community with widespread prescription drug
advertisements aimed at consumers. Such studies and early indicia
regarding the effect of prescription drug advertising on consumers
underscore the extremely sensitive nature of advertising Schedule II
controlled substances that have highly addictive properties.
D. CongressionalActivity & Direct ConsumerAdvertising

Although state legislatures have not moved quickly to legislate on
this issue of Ritalin and related drugs, key congressional committees
are taking a close look at direct-to-consumer advertising.
In the House of Representatives, Representative W.J. "Billy"
Tauzin, a Louisiana Republican who chairs the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, held a hearing on developments • that
may
96
impact consumer access to, and demand for pharmaceuticals. In his
opening statement, Chairman Tauzin indicated he was "especially
interested in learning whether these ads lead to increased utilization of
inappropriate therapies." 97
Although the committee received testimony that information is
inadequate concerning potential risks associated with prescription
drugs that are advertised directly to consumers,9" there is not total
agreement among experts. In addition, the Director of the FDA's
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research testified that, at present, the
"FDA is not aware of any evidence that the risks of [direct-to-

93. Id.
94.

See MacDonald, supra note 85.

95.

See id.

96. Recent Developments which May Impact Consumer Access to, and Demand
for, Pharmaceuticals:HearingBefore the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
107th Cong. (2001).
97. Id. (opening statement of Chairman Tauzin).
98. Id. (testimony of John Golenski, Executive Director, Rx Health Value,
Washington, D.C.).
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consumer] promotion outweigh its benefits." 99 This position of the
FDA was re-iterated later in 2001 at a hearing before a key
subcommittee in the United States Senate.' °°
Another member of Congress is attempting to restrict direct-toconsumer advertising by amending the federal tax code.
Representative Pete Stark, Democrat of California, is the chief
sponsor of the Fair Balance Prescription Drug Advertisement Act.0 In
order for a pharmaceutical company's advertisements to be tax
deductible, this legislation would require that the company devote
equal text size or air time to describing the potential dangers and
benefits of the medication.'0 2 For print advertisements, Representative
Stark explains that the advertisement would be required to display the
pros and cons of a particular drug in equal typeface and space, and on
the same or facing pages.'0 3 In television and radio advertisements,
Representative Stark says that risk and benefit descriptions would be
° Under the legislation,
allotted equal airtime and volume level.'O
pharmaceutical companies that do not follow such
S 105 guidelines would be
ineligible for a federal advertising tax deduction.
While there is no direct legislation in either chamber of Congress
specifically targeting direct-to-consumer advertising of Schedule II
controlled substances, the activity discussed above does illustrate a
degree of concern in Congress surrounding wholesale prescription
drug advertising.

99. Id. (testimony of Jane Woodcock, M.D., Director, FDA,Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research).
100. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Pharmaceutical Medicines: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of Nancy Ostrove, Ph.D., Deputy Director, Division of Drug
Marketing, Advertising and Communications, FDA, Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research).
101. H.R. 2352, 107th Cong. (2001).
102. H.R. 2352, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001).
103. Press Release, Stark Introduces Fair Balance
Advertisement Act (June 27, 2001) (on file with author).
104. Id.
105. Id.

Prescription

Drug
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IV. RESTRICTING CONSUMER ADS FOR SCHEDULE II CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES: THE NEED TO SURVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY

Building on all the information above, the final section of this
comment will focus on how to construct legislation to restrict the
direct-to-consumer advertising of psychotropic drugs in a manner
consistent with First Amendment constitutional scrutiny.
This section will explore strategies for restricting consumer targeted
advertising of Schedule II controlled substances in a manner that
would survive First Amendment review. First, the Constitution and the
Supreme Court's history on commercial speech will be discussed.
Second, the current standard of judicial review for commercial speech
restrictions will be outlined. Third, there will be an analysis of how
Congress could narrowly tailor a psychotropic drug advertising
restriction that could withstand scrutiny by the courts.
A. Background: The FirstAmendment and CommercialSpeech
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any law
"abridging the freedom of speech."' '° Understanding what constitutes
commercial speech is key to understanding the degree of First
Amendment protection. The speech in question, commercial
advertising, is speech that does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction. "107
The Supreme Court has made it clear that under the First
Amendment, commercial speech enjoys limited constitutional
protection. In 1976, the Court ushered in the modern development of
its commercial speech doctrine in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The Court rejected the "highly
paternalistic" view that the government has absolute power to

106.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

107. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
108. See generally Michelle D. Ehrlich, Note, Doctors can 'just say no': The
Constitutionality of Consumer-Directed Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 12
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 535 (1990) (discussing the evolution of the Court's
commercial speech doctrine).
109. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a Virginia statute that held
licensed pharmacists guilty of unprofessional conduct if they advertised or
promoted prices for prescription drugs).
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suppress or regulate commercial speech.10 Even if an advertiser's
interest is solely economic, it "hardly disqualifies" him from First
Amendment protection."' Commercial speech has some degree of
constitutional protection, however, the Court clearly distinguishes
between commercial speech and other varieties of speech." 2 This
distinction has led the Court to afford lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression."' The
level of protection for commercial expression, discussed below,
depends both on the nature of the commercial expression
and the
4
stated governmental interests served by its regulation.

B. CurrentStandard: CommercialSpeech & the FirstAmendment
Several cases".5 following Virginia Board of Pharmacy" 6 expounded
on the Court's rationale for offering limited constitutional protection
for commercial speech. The Court, however, did not outline a
definitive test until 1980 in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.

Public Service Commission."' Under Central Hudson, if the
commercial communication or advertisement is neither "misleading
nor related to unlawful activity" the government's ability to regulate
speech is restricted."' The bounds of the government's restriction are
contained within Central Hudson's four-part test.
The first inquiry concerns the previously mentioned unlawful or
misleading activity. Advertising must pass a four-prong test in order to
survive First Amendment scrutiny. First, the commercial speech must
not be "misleading or related to unlawful activity." ' 9 The second prong
requires the state to assert a substantial interest that will be served by

110. Id. at 770.
111. Id.at 762.
112. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
113. Id. at 456-57.
114. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
115. See generally Friedman v Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. State Bar
Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
116. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
117. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
118. Id. at 564.
119. Id.
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commercial speech restrictions.2 0 If the first two prongs are answered
affirmatively, the third step is whether the regulation "directly
advance[s] the state interest involved.. 2. Here, if the regulation
provides merely "ineffective or remote support" for the government's
interest, the regulation may not be sustained.122 Finally, if the
governmental interest could be served by a "more limited' 23restriction,
then the restriction on commercial speech cannot survive.
In the two decades following Central Hudson, the Court has used
this test to invalidate statutes prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited
commercial advertisements for contraceptives, 2 banning in-person
solicitation by certified public accountants,1 25 prohibiting beer labels
from displaying alcohol content,116 disallowing the advertisement of
liquor prices 27 and prohibiting the broadcast of lottery information!
The application of Central Hudson in the above instances concerned
various regulations prohibiting truthful, non-misleading speech about a
lawful product. The Court stated that absolute commercial speech
prohibitions "rarely survive constitutional review,, 129 while reiterating
that the state does not have broad discretion to "suppress truthful,
non-misleading information for paternalistic purposes." 30 In addition,
the Court appears comfortable retaining the Central Hudson standard,
saying as recently as 1999, that it saw "no need to break new
ground."'' With the trend clearly against blanket prohibitions on
commercial speech, the constitutionality of a prohibition on direct-to-

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. In applying the newly developed test, the Court found that New York's
interest in energy conservation was clearly substantial and directly advanced by
advertising restrictions, but held the regulations were too restrictive and that less
restrictive regulations could have protected the asserted interest just as effectively.
124. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
125.
126.
127.
128.
(1999).
129.
130.
131.

Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504.
Id. at 510.
GreaterNew Orleans,527 U.S. at 184.
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consumer advertising of Schedule II prescription drugs must be
analyzed with great precision.

C. Surviving ConstitutionalScrutiny: Prohibitingthe Direct Consumer
Advertising of Schedule I PrescriptionDrugs.

A step-by-step analysis of the Central Hudson test and subsequent
interpretations, illustrates the arguments the federal government must
make
to ensure
legislation prohibiting
direct-to-consumer
advertisement of Schedule II controlled substances will survive judicial
review.
1. Speech Must Not Be Untruthful or Misleading.

Step one of the Central Hudson analysis is determining whether or
not a commercial advertisement of Schedule II drugs like Ritalin is
eligible for constitutional protection. Under this test, commercial
speech "at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading,"
for First Amendment protection to attach.132 There is no dispute that
the use of Schedule II prescription drugs is a lawful activity, so
attention must turn to whether such advertising would be
"misleading".
The "misleading" element of the first step of Central Hudson is split
into two categories, "inherently" misleading and "potentially"
misleading. 3 3 If speech is "inherently" misleading, the restriction is
valid and the rest of the Central Hudson analysis is unnecessary.' T The
key determination is whether the speech is "more likely to deceive the
public than inform it.' ' 3 5 Given the current FDA guidelines for

prescription drug advertising, it is highly doubtful that consumer
advertisements for psychotropic prescription drugs would deceive the
public in such a manner as to be branded "inherently" misleading.
The second category is commercial speech that is "potentially"
misleading. If speech is "potentially" misleading, there can be no
proscription without completing the Central Hudson test.3 6 The Ninth
Circuit has held that courts should evaluate a speech restriction by

132. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
133. See W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1298 (D. Nev.
1999).
134.

Id.

135.
136.

Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
W. States, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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"focusing on its potential for deception in light of the lessons of
experience and the nature of the target audience."'37 In the context of
Schedule II drugs, such as Ritalin, advertising ban proponents could
assert that such advertisements are potentially misleading because
there is no conceivable manner in which the advertisements could
convey the highly addictive nature of psychotropic prescription drugs.
This is especially the case when considering the "target audience" of
such advertisements consists of lay people with no medical
background. Regardless of whether or not such advertisements are
potentially misleading, it is most likely that such advertisements,
generally, would not be viewed by the court as untruthful or inherently
misleading to a degree that would preclude further constitutional
analysis.
2. Government Must Assert a SubstantialInterest
The second step of the Central Hudson analysis is whether the
government has asserted a "substantial" interest in targeting the
protected speech.' The state does not have the authority to "regulate
speech that poses no danger to the asserted state interest." "9 Prior
cases before the Court indicate that this is not a rigorous standard to
meet.'4
The most obvious governmental interest in prohibiting direct-toconsumer advertisements of Schedule II prescription drugs is the
health and safety of American citizens. The problems associated with
these controlled substances are well documented. The DEA says that
Ritalin and other stimulants rank among the most frequently stolen
prescription drugs.141 Such theft and inappropriate use has created a
growing, illegal traffic of what are potent and dangerous speed-like
stimulants 42 A recent report by the Associated Press supports the

137.

Ass'n.of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 1994).

138. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
139. Id. at 557.
140. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996)(finding
Rhode Island's interest in reducing alcohol consumption by its citizens was
"substantial"); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1995). (Court
agreed that the government's interest in curbing alcohol "strength wars" was
"substantial" in the type of social harm the government hoped to prevent); Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (Court said New York's concern that rates be fair and
efficient represents a clear and substantial government interest).
141. Petersen & Zernike, supra note 5, at Al.
142. Id.
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DEA's claim that one in five college students uses Ritalin, or related
stimulants, recreationally.1 4 1 One study reported that drug-related
emergency room admissions for ten to fourteen-year old patients are44
just as likely to involve prescription stimulants as they were cocaine.'
Yet another study, conducted for the Massachusetts Department of
Public Health, found that among students in grades six through twelve,
abuse of ADHD drugs ranked higher than that of cocaine and
amphetamines, and almost as high as inhalants.14 Noting that most
dealers are children who are prescribed the stimulants, DEA
pharmacologist Gretchen Feussner sums up the substantial
government interest involved, saying, "[t]here already is not the
oversight
we'd like to see of this drug, and ads can only make it
14
worse."
Although not as compelling as the governmental interest in curbing
drug abuse and illegal trafficking of Ritalin and related stimulants,
another interest the government could assert is preventing the
inappropriate or over-medicating of America's school children. The
number of children taking psychiatric drugs increased by 650%
between 1990 and 1997.147 This increase comes despite the fact that
many in the medical community dispute the widespread diagnosis of
ADHD.'4 8 In fact, the recent actions taken by Minnesota and
Connecticut were in large part due to a concern that educators were
contributing
to the growing number of students on Ritalin-like
1 49
stimulants.
Proponents of prohibiting consumer advertising for Schedule II
stimulants would likely satisfy the "substantial" interest prong of the
Central Hudson test. In noting that a state has a substantial interest in
reducing alcoholism and its attendant costs, the Supreme Court has
held that the government has a "significant interest in protecting the

143. See White, supra note 3.
144. Id. Seventy-five percent of those emergency room admissions involved
recreational use of prescription stimulants.
145. See Lazar, supra note 41, at Al.
146. Thomas, supra note 1, at D1.
147. Fine, supra note 17.
148. See Diller, supra note 60 (discussing lack of medical basis for ADHD
diagnosis and influence of pharmaceutical industry on public perception of
ADHD); See also White, supra note 3 (Dr. Mary Ann Block says "There is no such
thing as ADHD. It is a made-up diagnosis.").
149. Fine, supra note 17.

20031

Recent Developments

health, safety, and welfare of its citizens."' 5 ° The D.C. Circuit in
Pearson v. Shalala stated that "[a]t this level of generality . . . a
substantial government interest is undeniable."' 5 ' Moreover, the very
fact that an international agreement preventing the promotion of
psychotropic drugs has existed for thirty years is compelling evidence
2
to their harmful nature and susceptibility to abuse and trafficking.1
The last two steps in the Central Hudson analysis are the most
difficult for surviving constitutional scrutiny. These two steps are
closely intertwined. The first step asks whether a prohibition on such
advertisements "directly advance[s] the state interest involved,"'53
while the second step queries whether the relationship between the
government's ends and
54 the regulation chosen to accomplish those ends
is a "reasonable fit."'
3. Restriction Must Directly Advance Government Interest

To satisfy the third, "directly advance" step, the burden is on the
government, as the party seeking to uphold a restriction, to
"demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.' ' 155 Furthermore, this
burden cannot be satisfied by "mere speculation or conjecture."' 56
There is a direct link between direct-to-consumer advertising of
prescription drugs and an increase in the use of these drugs. Previously
cited statistics reveal that the fifty most heavily advertised drugs in
2000 experienced a thirty-two percent increase in sales from the
previous year.' It is not likely that the pharmaceutical companies
would spend $2.5 billion on print and broadcast advertising in 200018
unless it would increase the sales of their product. These ads in turn
mean more products are available in society. It is the prevalence and
potential increase of Schedule II stimulants in the public that the

150.

Rubin, 514 U.S. at 485.

151.
152.

Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
See 1971 Agreement, supra note 6.

153.

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp, 447 U.S. at 564.

154.

Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480

(1989).
155.
156.

Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71.
Id. at 770.

157.

See MacDonald, supra note 85.

158. Id.
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government seeks to prevent. If the DEA already ranks Ritalin-like
stimulants on its list of most abused and stolen prescription drugs, it
can be extrapolated that consumer advertisements leading to increased
prescriptions for stimulants will further inflate the abuse and illegal
trafficking of these highly addictive drugs.
While similar arguments were offered relative to drug regulation and
the Central Hudson analysis, a regulation prohibiting the narrow class
of Schedule II prescription drug advertisements can be distinguished.
The D.C. Circuit rejected the claim by the FDA in Pearson v. Shalala 5 9
that the public health would be directly advanced by prohibiting drug
producers from making health claims about FDA-approved dietary
supplements. The court held that the FDA did not assert a claim that
these products were harmful and rejected the agency's underlying
premise that consumers were too "simplistic" to investigate the health
claims being made by dietary supplement producers.16 The Ninth
Circuit, in deciding a case challenging the advertising prohibition on
particular compounded drugs, noted that the FDA did not assert such
drugs were harmful and that the stated interest in reducing the volume
of compounded drugs to serve public health is not directly
advanced by
162
"broad prohibitions on truthful and accurate speech.'
Prohibitions on the advertising of controlled substances can be
distinguished from those on compounded drugs or dietary supplements
because the harms associated with Schedule II prescription stimulants
are real and significant as the above evidence indicates. The Court in
Central Hudson said that the commercial speech regulation "may not
be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government's purpose.' ' 163 The evidence establishes that there are
societal harms associated with an increase in Schedule II prescription
drugs. The increase is statistically inevitable if widespread direct-toconsumer advertising of those products is allowed. This argument
satisfies the third part of the Central Hudson analysis that the
government interests asserted must be directly advanced by a
prohibition on consumer advertising of Ritalin-like stimulants.

159.
160.

164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
See id. at 656.

161.
162.
163.

Id.
W. States Med. Ctr., 69 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
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4. Restriction Must Not Be More Extensive than Necessary.

The fourth and final step in the Central Hudson analysis is a
determination of whether a restriction on consumer advertising for
controlled substances is "more extensive than is necessary to serve"
the government's interest.' 64 The Court elaborated on this standard
when it explained that the final prong of the test does not require that
a restriction be "absolutely the least severe that will achieve the
desired end."'65 Instead, the Court requires a "'fit' between the
those ends.... a
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish
66
reasonable."'
but
perfect,
necessarily
not
is
fit that
The final "reasonable fit" prong has proven difficult to meet because
of numerous state restrictions. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 167 the Supreme Court held Rhode Island's ban on liquor price
advertising to be more extensive than necessary, and pointed to
alternatives, such as raising liquor taxes, that were a less speechrestrictive means of promoting the state's asserted interest of
temperance.'9 In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n. v. United
States, the Supreme Court held a statute restricting gambling
advertising was suspect and invalid because it "sacrifice[d] an
intolerable amount of truthful speech about lawful conduct when
compared to all of the policies at stake and the social ills that one could
reasonably hope such a ban to eliminate.' 7 °
A narrowly tailored prohibition on Schedule II prescription drug
advertising can be distinguished. For example, the Court was correct in
Greater New Orleans in saying that a prohibition on particular types of
gambling advertisements was not the proper vehicle for combating the
social ills of gambling.17 ' Also, the Court in 44 Liquormart noted that
other non-speech alternatives existed that the state could exercise in
encouraging temperance among its citizens. 72 There are two major
differences, however, concerning a prohibition on advertising Schedule
II stimulants in order to reduce their abuse and illegal trafficking. The

164.
165.
166.

Id. at 569-70.
Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York, 492 U.S. at 480.
Id. (citations omitted).

167.
16&
169.
170.
171.
172.

517 U.S. 484 (1996).
Id. at 509.
527 U.S. 173 (1999).
Id. at 194.
Id. at 186-87.
44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 507.
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first difference concerns the government interest in preventing illegal
behavior, while the second involves the limitations of alternative
means of reducing the abuse and trafficking of Schedule II stimulants.
The first difference is that the government interest and harm the
government seeks to prevent focuses on illegal behavior. Abusing or
trafficking in Ritalin-like prescription drugs is illegal criminal activity.
This is not the case with the harms associated with the legal activities
of alcohol consumption and casino gambling the Court addressed in 44
Liquormart and Greater New Orleans. While the activities involved in
those instances may be termed as "vice" activity, the Court rejected
any notion of a "vice" exception to the constitutional protection
afforded commercial speech. 73 Specifically, the Court did not support
such an approach when applied to products that may be "lawfully"
purchased on the open market. 174 Again, the very activity the
prohibition of advertising seeks to reduce is not lawful activity, but the
illegal abuse and trafficking of prescription drug stimulants.
The second difference involves the availability of alternative means
of reaching the stated end of reducing the abuse and trafficking of
Schedule II stimulants. One example is in 44 Liquormart, where the
Court discusses different options at the State's disposal to meet the
goal of temperance.' Another example is in Greater New Orleans,
where the Court notes areas in which federal law supports, at least
implicitly, legal gambling and that those statutes contradict the
government's stated interest to limit gambling.
These problems
would not be present in the creation of a federal statute prohibiting the
direct-to-consumer advertising of Schedule II prescription drugs for
numerous reasons.
First, there are no viable non-speech alternatives the government
can undertake to reduce the abuse or illegal trafficking of Schedule II
prescription stimulants. The DEA already maintains tight controls
over the production of Ritalin-like stimulants 7 7 and severe criminal
penalties currently exist for dealing or trafficking in these controlled
178
substances.
Furthermore,
can only receive
prescription stimulants
fromanaindividual
licensed pharmacist
after Schedule
receiving IIa

173.
174.

Id. at 514.
Id.

175. Id. at 507.
176. GreaterNew Orleans,527 U.S. at 191-92.
177. See Diller, supra note 60.
178. U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Trafficking Penalties, availableat
http://www.dea.gov/agency/penalties.htm (last visited May 15, 2003).
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prescription from a licensed physician. Despite all of these measures,
abuse and trafficking of Schedule II prescription stimulants is on the
rise. 179 Second, unlike the instance in Greater New Orleans, there does
not appear to be any federal statute contradicting the government's
interest in curtailing the abuse and illegal trafficking of Schedule II
prescription stimulants.
The only conceivable alternative that opponents may raise as
evidence that a complete prohibition on prescription stimulant
advertising is more extensive than necessary is the use of disclaimers.
In Pearson, the D.C. Circuit Court cited numerous Supreme Court
cases for the principle that disclaimers are "constitutionally preferable
to outright suppression." 18 This proposition was followed by the Ninth
Circuit where the court found a complete prohibition on the
advertising of compounded drugs invalid."' The Ninth Circuit held a
FDA disclaimer requirement would be an alternative to the
advertising prohibition and would "clearly represent a far less
restrictive means to accomplish the FDA's asserted goals."' 8 2
Requiring a disclaimer in lieu of an outright ban on the advertising
of Schedule II prescription stimulants merits discussion. While
conceding that the requirement of a disclaimer may represent a less
restrictive means to accomplish the government's interest in not
inappropriately or over-medicating its school children, such an
alternative would likely not satisfy the government's interest in
reducing the abuse and illegal trafficking in prescription drug
stimulants. Requiring a disclaimer in every print or electronic directto-consumer Schedule II prescription drug advertisement saying,
"Ritalin (or other brand name) is a highly addictive stimulant like
cocaine and morphine and should only be taken while under the care
of a physician," may certainly be adequate to warn parents and
children of the risks associated with psychotropic drugs and overmedication.

179.

Petersen & Zernike, supra note 5, at Al.

180.

Pearson, 164 F.3d at 657; see also Peel v. Attorney Registration &

Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988).
181.

W. States Med. Ctr., 69 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.

182.

Id.
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Similarly, a required disclaimer contained in an advertisement for a
Ritalin-like stimulant could say, "There is currently no objective test to
determine the presence of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder and
you are encouraged to talk to your doctor." While admittedly
outrageous, this disclaimer would certainly serve a governmental
interest in slowing the explosive growth of ADHD diagnoses and
stimulant prescriptions.
Such disclaimers, however, do nothing to advance the government's
interest in reducing the abuse or illegal trafficking in Schedule II
prescription stimulants. Even with the most descriptive disclaimer
imaginable, the purpose of direct-to-consumer advertising is to
increase sales of a product to the general public. This increase in sales,
as discussed above, can be reasonably calculated to lead to an increase
in the availability of Schedule II stimulants for abuse and illegal
trafficking.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the courts are hostile to restrictions on truthful and
non-misleading commercial speech. The compelling and substantial
state interest in preventing increased abuse and illegal trafficking of
Schedule II prescription stimulants, however, provides an excellent
opportunity for the government to attempt to narrowly tailor
legislation to codify what had been a voluntary thirty-year
international agreement to prohibit the direct promotion of these
highly addictive drugs to consumers. As the proliferation of direct-toconsumer advertising of stimulants continues, Congress must not
remain silent. If Congress is to approve legislation aimed at restricting
direct-to-consumer advertising of stimulants, interested lawmakers
must start compiling the evidence needed to demonstrate the presence
of a substantial government interest in deterring the abuse and illegal
trafficking of Schedule II stimulants. Only a solid foundation built
upon evidence of a substantial government interest coupled with the
absence of viable alternatives will withstand judicial review.
Hudson analysis

